To participate in this Consciousness Survey, you’ll need to find the answer to a very easy question

Interested in participating in a (totally unscientific) survey on consciousness and related questions? The link is in the preceding post. Once you complete the survey, you’ll be able to see the results. It should take between 20 and 45 minutes to complete, and will hopefully be stimulating, at least somewhat.

The password for the post is the last name of the philosopher who coined the term “Hard Problem of Consciousness”. It is very easy to google the answer. Capitalize in the standard way.

Cheers!

adventures-skitzland-864.jpg

“Psychic cells” were silly in 1909. And they are still silly, regardless of what you call them.

Brodmann-areas

Here is Korbinian Brodmann (of cortical Brodmann area fame) writing about a trend towards assigning functional roles to single neurons based on anatomical type, back in 1909:

“There has been occasional talk of “sensory cells” located in particular regions, or of sensitive or sensorial “special cells”. People have invented acoustic or optic special cells and even a “memory” (*12) cell, and have not shied away from the fantastic “psychic cell”. Apart from the fact that such so-called “special cells” have only been described in young or foetal brain with the Golgi method and mainly only in animals, and therefore lack confirmation in the adult human brain, and quite apart from the fact that no attempt has been made to determine the precise regional location of the zone within which such cells appear exclusively, it seems to me that to pose this problem is wrong.” [emphasis added]

And here is a news item from a couple of years ago:

BigNeuron

Psychic cells indeed! Or perhaps we should call them zombie cells.

(Zombie concepts keep coming back from the dead to eat our brains. Other examples include ‘selfish genes’ and ‘pleasure molecules’.)

Is the mind a machine?

My latest 3QD essay explores the “mind as machine” metaphor, and metaphors in general.

Putting the “cog” in “cognitive”: on the “mind as machine” metaphor

Here’s an excerpt:

People who study the mind and brain often confront the limits of metaphor. In the essay ‘Brain Metaphor and Brain Theory‘, the vision scientist John Daugman draws our attention to the fact that thinkers throughout history have used the latest material technology as a model for the mind and body. In the Katha Upanishad (which Daugman doesn’t mention), the body is a chariot and the mind is the reins. For the pre-Socratic Greeks, hydraulic metaphors for the psyche were popular: imbalances in the four humors produced particular moods and dispositions. By the 18th and 19th centuries, mechanical metaphors predominated in western thinking: the mind worked like clockwork. The machine metaphor has remained with us in some form or the other since the industrial revolution: for many contemporary scientists and philosophers, the only debate seems to be about what sort of machine the mind really is. Is it an electrical circuit? A cybernetic feedback device? A computing machine that manipulates abstract symbols? Some thinkers so convinced that the mind is a computer that they invite us to abandon the notion that the idea is a metaphor. Daugman quotes the cogntive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn, who claimed that “there is no reason why computation ought to be treated merely as a metaphor for cognition, as opposed to the literal nature of cognition”.

Daugman reacts to this Whiggish attitude with a confession of incredulity that many of us can relate to: “who among us finds any recognizable strand of their personhood or of their experience of others and of the world and its passions, to be significantly illuminated by, or distilled in, the metaphor of computation?.” He concludes his essay with the suggestion that “[w]e should remember than the enthusiastically embraced metaphors of each “new era” can become, like their predecessors, as much the prisonhouse of thought as they at first appeared to represent its liberation.”

Read the rest at 3 Quarks Daily:

Putting the “cog” in “cognitive”: on the “mind as machine” metaphor

Could the brain be a radio for receiving consciousness?

 

bradio.pngHere’s an answer I wrote a while ago to the following question:

 Is there any conclusive proof that the brain produces consciousness? What rules out the case that brain acts as receptor antennae for consciousness?

This is actually a fun question! Taken in the right spirit, it can be a good way to learn about what science is, and also what the limitations of science are. Continue reading

“Conscious realism”: a new way to think about reality (or the lack thereof?)

Venn

Interesting interview in the Atlantic with cognitive scientist Donald D. Hoffman:

The Case Against Reality

“I call it conscious realism: Objective reality is just conscious agents, just points of view. Interestingly, I can take two conscious agents and have them interact, and the mathematical structure of that interaction also satisfies the definition of a conscious agent. This mathematics is telling me something. I can take two minds, and they can generate a new, unified single mind. Here’s a concrete example. We have two hemispheres in our brain. But when you do a split-brain operation, a complete transection of the corpus callosum, you get clear evidence of two separate consciousnesses. Before that slicing happened, it seemed there was a single unified consciousness. So it’s not implausible that there is a single conscious agent. And yet it’s also the case that there are two conscious agents there, and you can see that when they’re split. I didn’t expect that, the mathematics forced me to recognize this. It suggests that I can take separate observers, put them together and create new observers, and keep doing this ad infinitum. It’s conscious agents all the way down.”

[…]

Here’s the striking thing about that. I can pull the W out of the model and stick a conscious agent in its place and get a circuit of conscious agents. In fact, you can have whole networks of arbitrary complexity. And that’s the world.

[…]

“As a conscious realist, I am postulating conscious experiences as ontological primitives, the most basic ingredients of the world. I’m claiming that experiences are the real coin of the realm. The experiences of everyday life—my real feeling of a headache, my real taste of chocolate—that really is the ultimate nature of reality.”

I don’t agree with everything in the article (especially the quantum stuff) but I think many people interested in consciousness and metaphysics will find plenty of food for thought here:

The Case Against Reality

Also, the “conscious agents all the way down” is the exact position I was criticizing in a recent 3QD essay:

3quarksdaily: Persons all the way down: On viewing the scientific conception of the self from the inside out

The diagram above is from a science fiction story I was working on, back when I was a callow youth. It closely related to the idea of a network of conscious agents. Here’s another ‘version’ of it.

TriHead

Not sure why I made it look so morbid. 🙂

Is it possible for the Internet to one day gain consciousness?

A recent Quora answer I wrote:

Sometimes I wonder if Quora bots are conscious! 🙂
I often think about whether the internet could become sentient… and also whether it is already! But the most important question is this: how would we tell one way or the other? Perhaps each of us is like a neuron in the internet’s hive brain.
Neurons and brains are separated by a gulf of scale, structure, and complexity. How could a neuron ‘know’ that the brain it is part of is conscious? How could a brain know if a neuron (or group of neurons) is conscious? It may be an unbridgeable gap. And the same sort of gap may exist between humans and the internet. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, if the internet could talk we would not understand it.
In any case, the internet doesn’t even have a ‘mouth’ or a central communication device. How do we decide what the internet is ‘saying’? I could imagine a future in which ‘analysts’ read into the internet’s dynamic trajectories in the way astrologers read into the stars’ trajectories.
Sometimes I think of consciousness as an irreducibly social phenomenon. Consciousness may be the ‘fire’ produced by the ‘friction’ between different intelligent agents that each have partial knowledge of the world. Perhaps the test of whether the internet is conscious involves encountering an alien internet. Perhaps when civilizations from two different planets interact, their ‘planetary consciousnesses’ (or internets) interact in a way that their inhabitants only have a dim awareness of.

 

Is it possible for the Internet to one day gain consciousness?

Is consciousness complex?

Someone on Quora asked the following question: What’s the correlation between complexity and consciousness?

Here’s my answer:

Depends on who you ask! Both complexity and consciousness are contentious words, and mean different things to different people.

I’ll build my answer around the idea of complexity, since it’s easier to talk about scientifically (or at least mathematically) than consciousness. Half-joking comments about complexity and consciousness are to be found in italics.

I came across a nice list of measures of complexity, compiled by Seth Lloyd, a researcher from MIT, which I will structure my answer around. [pdf]

Lloyd describes measures of complexity as ways to answer three questions we might ask about a system or process:

  1. How hard is it to describe?
  2. How hard is it to create?
  3. What is its degree of organization?

1. Difficulty of description: Some objects are complex because they are difficult for us to describe. We frequently measure this difficulty in binary digits (bits), and also use concepts like entropy (information theory) and Kolmogorov (algorithmic) complexity. I particularly like Kolmogorov complexity. It’s a measure of the computational resources required to specify a string of characters. It’s the size of the smallest algorithm that can  generate that string of letters or numbers (all of which can be  converted into bits). So if you have a string like  “121212121212121212121212”, it has a description in English — “12  repeated 12 times” — that is even shorter that the actual string. Not very complex. But the string “asdh41ubmzzsa4431ncjfa34” may have no description shorter than the string itself, so it will have higher Kolmogorov complexity. This measure of complexity can also give us an interesting way to talk about randomness. Loosely speaking, a random process is one whose simulation is harder to accomplish than simply watching the process unfold! Minimum message length is a related idea that also has practical applications. (It seems Kolmogorov complexity is technically uncomputable!)

Consciousness is definitely hard to describe. In fact we seem to be stuck at the description stage at the moment. Describing consciousness is so difficult that bringing in bits and algorithms seem a tad premature. (Though as we shall see, some brave scientists beg to differ.)

2. Difficulty of creation: Some objects and processes are seen as complex because they are really hard  to make. Komogorov complexity could show up here too, since simulating a string can be seen both as an act of description (the code itself) and an act  of creation (the output of the code). Lloyd lists the following  terms that I am not really familiar with: Time Computational Complexity; Space Computational Complexity; Logical depthThermodynamic depth; and “Crypticity” (!?).  In additional to computational  difficulty, we might add other costs: energetic, monetary, psychological, social, and ecological. But perhaps then we’d be  confusing the complex with the cumbersome? 🙂

Since we haven’t created a consciousness yet, and don’t know how nature accomplished it, perhaps we are forced to say that consciousness really is complex from the perspective of artificial synthesis. But if/when we have made an artificial mind — or settled upon a broad definition of consciousness that includes existing machines — then perhaps we’ll think of consciousness as easy! Maybe it’s everywhere already! Why pay for what’s free?

3. Degree of organization: Objects and processes that seem intricately structured are also seen as  complex. This type of complexity differs strikingly from computational complexity. A string of random noise is extremely complex from an information-theoretic perspective, because it is virtually incompressible — it  cannot be condensed into a simple algorithm. A book consisting of totally random characters contains more information, and is therefore more algorithmically complex, that a meaningful  text of the same length. But strings of random characters are typically interpreted as totally lacking in structure, and are therefore in a sense very simple. Some measures that Lloyd associates with organizational complexity include: Fractal dimension, metric entropy, Stochastic Complexity and several more, most of which I confess I had never heard of until today. I suspect that characterizing organizational structure is an ongoing research endeavor. In a sense that’s what mathematics is — the study of abstract structure.

Consciousness seems pretty organized, especially if you’re having a good day! But it’s also the framework by which we come to know that organization exists in nature in the first place…so this gets a bit Ioopy . 🙂

Seth Lloyd ends his list with concepts that are related to complexity, but don’t necessarily have measures. These I think are particularly relevant to consciousness and, to the more prosaic world I work in: neural network modeling.

Self-organization
Complex adaptive system
Edge of chaos

Consciousness may or may not be self-organized, but it definitely adapts, and it’s occasionally chaotic.

To Lloyd’s very handy list led me also add self-organized criticality and emergence. Emergence is an interesting concept which has been falsely accused of being obscurantism. A property is emergent is if is seen in a system, but not in any constituent of the system. For instance, the thermodynamic gas laws emerge out of kinetic theory, but they make no reference to molecules. The laws governing gases show up when there is a large enough number of particles, and when these laws reveal themselves, microscopic details often become irrelevant. But gases are the least interesting substrates for emergence. Condensed matter physicists talk about phenomena like the emergence of quasiparticles, which are excitations in a solid that behave as if they are independent particles, but depend for this independence, paradoxically, on the physics of the whole object.  (Emergence is a fascinating subject in its own right, regardless of its relevance to consciousness. Here’s a paper that proposes a neat formalism for talking about emergence: Emergence is coupled to scope, not level. PW Anderson’s classic paper “More is Different” also talks about a related issue: pdf )

Consciousness may well be an emergent process — we rarely say that a single neuron or a chunk of nervous tissue has a mind of its own. Consciousness is a word that is reserved for the whole organism, typically.

So is consciousness complex? Maybe…but not really in measurable ways. We can’t agree on how to describe it, we haven’t created it artificially yet, and we don’t know how it is organized, or how it emerged!

In my personal opinion many of the concepts people associate with consciousness are far outside of the scope of mainstream science. These include qualia, the feeling of what-it-is-like, and intentionality, the observation that mental “objects” always seems to be “about” something.

This doesn’t mean I think these aspects of consciousness are meaningless, only that they are scientifically intractable. Other aspects of  consciousness, such as awareness, attention, and emotion might also be shrouded in mystery, but I think neuroscience has much to say about them — this is because they have some measurable aspects, and these aspects step out of the shadows during neurological disorders, chemical modulation, and other abnormal states of being.

However…

There are famous neuroscientists who might disagree. Giulio Tononi has come up with something called integrated information theory, which comes with a measure of consciousness he christened phi. Phi is supposed to capture the degree of “integratedness” of a network. I remain quite skeptical of this sort of thing — for now it  seems to be a metaphor inspired by information theory, rather than a measurable quantity. I can’t imagine how we will be able  to relate it to actual experimental data. Information, contrary to popular perception, is not something intrinsic to physical objects. The amount of information in a signal depends on the device receiving the signal. Right now we have no way of knowing how many “bits” are being transmitted between two neurons, let alone between entire regions of the brain. Information theory is best applied when we already know the nature of the message, the communication channel, and the encoding/decoding process. We have only partially characterized these  aspects of neural dynamics. Our experimental data seem far too fuzzy  for any precise formal approach. [Information may actually be a concept of very limited use in biology, outside of data fitting. See this excellent paper for more: A deflationary account of information in biology. This sums it up: “if information is in the concrete world, it is causality. If it is abstract, it is in the head.”]

But perhaps this paper  will convince me otherwise: Practical Measures of Integrated Information for Time-Series Data. [I very much doubt it though.]

___

I thought I would write a short answer… but I ended up learning a lot as I added more info.

View Answer on Quora